Arya News - Parties dig in, hurl accusations fanned by `self-serving` interpretations.
SEOUL – President Lee Jae Myung’s push to complete the transfer of wartime operational control to Seoul by 2030 has reignited one of South Korea’s longest-running security debates, with liberals emphasizing sovereignty and conservatives warning against allowing a political timetable to take precedence over military readiness.
The dispute comes as the security environment surrounding the Korea-US alliance is in flux, with Washington calling on Seoul to shoulder greater responsibility for its own defense and questions growing over the alliance’s role beyond deterring North Korea.
The Lee administration is seeking to complete the transfer before its term ends in 2030, while the US continues to maintain that the transition should remain conditions-based.
The two positions are not necessarily incompatible. US Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson said in April that the allies had submitted a road map aimed at meeting the necessary conditions no later than the first quarter of 2029. At the same time, he stressed that “political expediency” should not outpace those conditions.
At home, however, the issue has once again developed into a partisan battle, with the two sides trading accusations of fearmongering and endangering national security.
Lee has accused his political opponents of politicizing matters of national security.
“(Unlike in advanced countries), the most important issues on foreign affairs and security become the topic of political battles here,” the liberal president said during a policy briefing by foreign affairs authorities in early August.
Lee also highlighted the importance of persuading others, rather than confronting them, in pursuing the liberal bloc’s ideological goals.
‘Sovereignty’ first
In pushing for a time-based transfer plan, Lee has repeatedly emphasized sovereignty, saying that reducing South Korea’s defense reliance is “a matter of our people’s pride.”
At a Cabinet meeting in April, Lee instructed Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back to raise public awareness of the South Korean military’s own defense capabilities, citing the Global Firepower index, which has ranked South Korea’s conventional military power fifth in the world for three consecutive years since 2024.
At the time, Ahn said concerns about military independence stemmed from “incitements by certain groups.”
Democratic Party floor spokesperson Rep. Kim Sung-hoi went a step further, accusing conservatives ― who argue that a time-based transfer puts politics ahead of security ― of “baseless fearmongering” that would undermine the Korea-US alliance.
The liberal bloc has framed the OPCON transfer in terms of sovereignty and South Korea taking greater responsibility for its own defense.
Conservatives, however, argue that the timing should be determined by military readiness rather than a political deadline, particularly given North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and South Korea’s reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
“There should be no room for emotions when talking about national security,” Rep. Kim Gunn of the People Power Party told The Korea Herald.
The career diplomat-turned-lawmaker also said, “Constantly bringing up ‘sovereignty’ would shift the attention away (from the core issue being discussed on national security) and mislead the public.”
Right-leaning independent Rep. Han Dong-hoon in a parliamentary forum Tuesday criticized Lee’s foreign policy for his “overuse of rhetoric” intended to allay citizens’ concerns, claiming that instead it has caused a misunderstanding with the US.
A question of conditions
The dispute over timing has defined the OPCON debate for years, with South Korea’s liberals and conservatives going back and forth between time- and conditions-based approaches.
Liberals have argued that a conditions-based approach could delay the transfer indefinitely, while conservatives maintain that setting a deadline before the conditions are met could weaken the allies’ ability to respond to growing geopolitical uncertainty.
The idea of Seoul taking wartime OPCON from the US was first raised during the presidential election campaign in the late 1980s, and successive administrations have addressed the issue to varying degrees.
Although South Korea regained peacetime operational control of its military in 1994, wartime operational control is exercised through the South Korea-US Combined Forces Command over designated South Korean and US forces.
Under the envisioned post-transfer structure, the combined command would remain in place but be led by a South Korean four-star general rather than a US general.
With Korea being the only country in the world whose wartime OPCON is in the hands of a foreign ally under a bilateral alliance structure, the question of “sovereignty” has been raised time and again over the years.
In 2006, former liberal President Roh Moo-hyun launched an initiative to regain wartime OPCON under a timetable that eventually set 2015 as the deadline. In 2014, however, the conservative Park Geun-hye administration restructured the agreement into a conditions-based process, removing the deadline.
The allies agreed that, for the transfer to take place, South Korea must demonstrate that its military is capable of leading the allies’ combined defense, that it can address North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and that security conditions on the Korean Peninsula and in the surrounding region are conducive to a stable transition.
People Power Party Rep. Na Kyung-won said on Facebook last week that fulfilling the conditions jointly verified by the allies was a “firm principle” that had yet to be achieved.
Na also criticized Lee for what she called “reckless remarks” about South Korea’s military capabilities while virtually ignoring North Korea’s nuclear buildup.
“A declaration to reclaim OPCON within his term is like pouring oil on fire,” she said.
Rep. Kim Joon-hyung of the minor liberal Rebuilding Korea Party, however, challenged the conditions themselves, saying they are vague and impossible to achieve.
According to Kim, the condition concerning regional stability around the Korean Peninsula amounts to saying that the US will “not give up on wartime OPCON, as long as the US recognizes that a threat exists in China.”
“All three conditions for the transfer will remain unfulfilled without the transfer having been completed,” added Kim, who formerly led the Korea National Diplomatic Academy.
The disagreement, therefore, extends beyond how quickly the conditions can be met to whether all of them can be objectively determined to have been fulfilled.
What is the alliance for?
The debate over OPCON also intersects with a broader question over South Korea’s role in a changing regional security environment involving China, Japan, North Korea, Russia and the US.
Brunson’s controversial remarks in spring about Indo-Pacific security challenges fueled debate over the role South Korea could play in a broader regional conflict.
Brunson described South Korea as “the dagger in the heart of Asia” that lies off the east coast of China in an interview in May. The remarks came alongside a separate speech at a forum that month, where he likened South Korea to “a fixed aircraft carrier” between China and Japan.
The comments prompted criticism from some liberals who questioned whether Washington increasingly viewed South Korea as part of a broader regional security strategy extending beyond deterrence against North Korea.
Rep. Boo Seung-chan, then a spokesperson for the Democratic Party, criticized Brunson for what he described as infringing on South Korea’s sovereignty in determining its own fate.
“South Korea’s security strategies are determined solely by the people,” Boo said in May. “No judgment by foreign countries can substitute for the sovereign decision of our people. Our people should decide whether South Korea becomes a shield or a dagger.”
The liberal bloc has also raised concerns about South Korea becoming part of a broader US strategy toward China.
“If we do not swiftly bring wartime OPCON back from the US, we will inevitably remain part of the US’ overall security strategy,” Kim of the Rebuilding Korea Party told The Korea Herald.
“Therefore, we will inevitably become an outpost to contain China.”
Conservatives, however, claim that the liberals’ approach to the matter obscures the nature of the alliance.
“Saying you don’t want an alliance entrapment while forming an alliance doesn’t make sense,” Kim of the People Power Party said.
He also warned about the consequences of a hurried OPCON transfer, citing the growing nuclear threat from North Korea and its deepening ties with Russia ― one of the major geopolitical changes to emerge during the decades of discussions over the OPCON transfer.
“Now that the circumstances have changed a lot, we must take back wartime operational control after thoroughly verifying whether we are prepared,” People Power Party’s Kim said.
‘Self-serving’ interpretations
The dispute reflects a long-running ideological divide over how the South Korea-US alliance should evolve, even as neither side questions the importance of the alliance itself.
What hampers a breakthrough is both sides’ “self-serving interpretation intended to rally their own support base” over how the alliance should be structured, said Eom Ki-hong, professor of political science at Kyungpook National University.
He added that the divide has been deepening due to politicians’ propensity to “live off the support of their voter base.”
At the same time, changes in Washington’s own approach to the alliance are adding another dimension to the debate.
US President Donald Trump has sought to reduce the US’ responsibilities in the alliance, most recently by ordering a scaling back of the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield joint exercise.
The political dispute comes at “a moment when US security credibility is being questioned worldwide,” said Darcie Draudt-Vejares, fellow for Korean Studies in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
She added that Seoul is being asked to take greater responsibility for its own defense “not simply in terms of burden-sharing or basing or operational control, but more broadly in terms of the division of roles and responsibilities within the alliance.”
Eom said that the conservatives’ traditional strategy of rallying right-wing supporters by emphasizing the North Korean threat and the need for stronger ties with the US “seems to be a thing of a bygone day.”
This is the third in a series of articles exploring how key foreign and security issues are politicized, how political issues spread beyond South Korea’s borders, and the costs this carries for South Korea’s national interest. — Ed.