Arya News - Talmiz Ahmad is a former Indian diplomat who has previously served as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE. In an exclusive interview with The Statesman, he urges New Delhi to move beyond bilateral ties toward collective regional engagement.
NEW DELHI – Talmiz Ahmad is a distinguished former Indian diplomat who served in key assignments across West Asia, including as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE. With decades of experience and deep expertise in West Asian affairs and energy policy, he has held senior positions in Indian missions and in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. In 2011, he was honoured with Saudi Arabia’s King Abdul Aziz Medal, First Class. In an exclusive conversation with Arti Bali , Ambassador Ahmad urges New Delhi to move beyond bilateral ties toward collective regional engagement, rebuild its relationship with Iran, and work with China where interests converge.
Talmiz Ahmad is a distinguished former Indian diplomat who served in key assignments across West Asia. PHOTO: COURTESY OF THE STATESMAN
Q: How should India balance Iran with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and the US?
A: India should continue its successful approach of maintaining strong bilateral ties across West Asia based on mutual interests. We should sustain substantial relations with Iran for energy and connectivity, with Saudi Arabia for energy, and with Israel, without having to choose between them. And not one relationship has been conditional on the ties that we have with any other player in the region. It is not necessary for India to pick and choose. India should take more interest in the region on a collective basis. India should look beyond bilateral ties and engage more diplomatically with the region as a whole. Our strong relationships with different countries give us credibility and an opportunity to promote peace and stability in the region. We carry a lot of credibility with the different players.
Q: After External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s latest UN remarks on terrorism and India’s right to self-defence, do you see IndiaPakistan relations moving toward sustained confrontation?
A: EAM Jaishankar has reiterated India’s policy after the horrific attack. Our PM (Narendra Modi) has publicly stated that terror attacks are unacceptable and indeed, will be viewed as an act of war. Pakistan continues to adopt cross-border terror as an instrument of state policy, and so long as this is in play, it is not conceivable that India would be able to rebuild ties with that country. But there should be some degree of engagement despite mutual distrust. Dialogue is important because we need to be in touch with each other. Not talking about a good relationship, nor am I talking about high-profile diplomatic engagements. Perhaps interaction can take place through security advisers, between diplomats and through third countries, or through intelligence agencies. If we need to improve ties, I would really like to see the Pakistani military establishment making it clear that they will not use cross-border terror as an instrument of pressure upon India. If we were to be convinced in this regard, there is no limit to how far we can go. Indian prime ministers have consistently not given up, but many of these initiatives have been ruined by horrific developments initiated from the Pakistani side.
Q: How vulnerable is India’s energy security?
A: The Gulf region provides the bulk of India’s oil and gas imports, and this is unlikely to change for decades. India will remain dependent on fossil fuels for many years. We have set 2070 as our net-zero target, but that date may have to be extended due to the lack of genuine international commitment. We must recognise that our energy security arrangements have been seriously jeopardised. The opening of Hormuz is crucial for India’s long-term interest, because the world’s major oil suppliers are located in that small area. It is not just the six countries of the GCC, but Iran and Iraq are also major energy sources. The opening of the Strait of Hormuz is crucial to India’s long-term interests. The war inflicted on the region by the United States did not originate there. The sources of instability include the use of military force, the propensity to resort to violence, and unconditional support for Israel’s maximalist agenda. India can only come up with short-term palliatives. We can buy more from the Russians. We can also diversify supplies from various other sources. But none of the other sources has the capacity and the potential that the Gulf countries have, and at the end of the day, the supplies to us can only be marginal and not on a long-term basis. The solution is for India to be actively involved in promoting regional stability. Obviously, India cannot dictate the policy approaches of the Americans, nor can it counsel restraint as far as Israel is concerned. But India has no choice but to be engaged diplomatically with the region to see how we can ensure longer-term stability.
Q: Is Iranian and Russian energy pressure the biggest test of strategic autonomy? What are India’s options?
A: Diversifying energy supplies is easier said than done. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait remain major long-term sources of regional energy. With threats to the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, regional suppliers are exploring alternative routes, but these will take time and require new pipelines to the Indian Ocean. India should actively participate in developing them. India must also reassess its ties with Iran. Despite US restrictions, stronger engagement with Iran is important for our long-term energy and connectivity interests. In the medium to long term, India needs a broader strategic approach to Iran and the region – promoting peace and stabi lity, rebui lding strategic partnerships, and strengthening the role of the Indian Navy in regional security. There is a substantial policy agenda ahead. The chokepoints are vulnerable, and we must closely monitor their security while building international consensus to curb reckless initiatives by the US and Israel, given their wider spillover effects. In West Asia, the Indian Ocean, and key chokepoints, Chinese and Indian interests often align. We should engage more actively with China rather than assume we are on opposite sides.
Q: How sustainable is India’s Russia strategy amid sanctions and ties with the US and Europe?
A: This position, when India asserts strategic autonomy and the United States expresses unhappiness and seeks to pressurise us, is not new. It goes back to 1947. It’s a consistent pattern as far as India-US relations are concerned. India’s Russia strategy remains sustainable because of its strategic autonomy – the freedom to make decisions based on national interests rather than pressure from the US or any other country. While sanctions may impose costs, India now has more economic, technological, and diplomatic alternatives through countries and groups such as BRICS and the SCO. Compared with 1947, India is economically stronger and has more global partnerships, making it better equipped to manage pressure from the US and Europe.
Q: India argues for a multipolar world, but can India genuinely maintain strategic autonomy when the US, Russia, China and Gulf powers increasingly expect countries to take clearer positions?
A: India should not be daunted by Washington. The multipolar world order is already here. The US is not a security guarantor, and its repeated unilateral military interventions – from Afghanistan and Iraq to Libya and Iran – have consistently failed to achieve its strategic aims while strengthening the credibility of middle powers. India can maintain strategic autonomy by avoiding dependence on any single power and pursuing partnerships based on its national interests. The US remains a major economic, technological and military power, but its ability to inflict harm has not translated into achieving strategic objectives. Meanwhile, countries such as France, Japan and Korea are reaching out to India’s strategic partners, and the US no longer has a monopoly on technology. With the rise of middle powers and their growing demand for a greater role in world affairs, India is already part of an emerging multipolar order.
Q: Pakistan acting as a mediator in US-Iran conflict: will it change course?
A: Pakistan’s role in regional mediation and its standing in Washington should encourage it to make a shift toward greater engagement with India, rather than hostility, as this better serves its interests. Pakistan has serious issues in Balochistan and in PoK, where there has been a popular uprising, and it has had regular exchange of fire with Afghanistan. This would be a very important occasion for Pakistan to declare that cross-border terror is no longer an acceptable policy approach. A Pakistani general is now the Secretary General of the Secretariat to manage the Defence Pact. How can you have a Pakistani general sitting in such a responsible position in Riyadh and his colleagues in Pakistan indulging in extremism and violence? Every country in West Asia abhors extremism. After the Mumbai attack, many Gulf countries turned to India and set up strategic partnership arrangements, primarily as a response to the sense of insecurity emanating from Pakistan. Pakistan should take a fresh look at its approach. Supporting cross-border terror has at no stage really yielded any benefits to Pakistan.
Q: What is your view of the Mecca Pact, and what are its implications for India?
A: Gulf countries that once viewed Iran as the main security concern now see Israel as the principal threat, particularly given its claim to regional military hegemony and its failure to accommodate Palestinian aspirations. This is the context in which the Mecca Defence Pact has emerged. Evolving from earlier Saudi Arabia–Pakistan defence arrangements, with Turkey now joining, the pact is primarily aimed at deterrence, not war. While India is not directly affected, Pakistan’s growing presence in West Asia could strengthen its defence capabilities. I’m not sure it will make a very significant strategic change as far as the regional balance is concerned, but it is something that India will need to take into account. The lesson is that India should be more actively engaged with the region, rebuild our ties with Iran, engage with the other countries on the basis of our shared security concerns, and be a visible, active and credible presence in the region, which we have not been for some time.
Q: Will the Group of Friends on Shipping and Seafarers achieve its objective?
A: With more than 20 per cent of world’s seafarers from India, it is logical for India to take lead on their welfare and safety, particularly following recent attacks on shipping at Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz as threats are now increasingly political, with asymmetric attacks directed at connectivity. Pipelines, sea lanes, data centres, and undersea cables are all regarded today as legitimate targets. Chokepoints are the targets, and we should not be complacent. India and like-minded countries must work to protect these vital lifelines. Beyond Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, India must also focus on the Malacca Strait and build international consensus to safeguard maritime connectivity.